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I explore the effect of accounting complexity on misreporting using a setting of revenue 
restatements.  I measure revenue recognition complexity using a factor score based on the 
number of words and revenue recognition methods from the revenue recognition 
disclosure in the 10-K just prior to the restatement announcement.  Results are consistent 
with revenue recognition complexity increasing the probability of revenue restatements, 
after controlling for other determinants of misreporting revenue.  These results are 
significant both statistically and economically and are robust to a number of different 
specifications.  I also test whether misreporting for complex revenue recognition firms is 
the result of mistakes or manipulation.  My tests provide no evidence consistent with 
complex revenue recognition being associated with manipulating revenue.  However, 
there is evidence that firms that restate revenue and have more complex revenue 
recognition are less likely to receive an AAER from the SEC and have less negative 
restatement announcement returns than firms with less complex revenue recognition, 
suggesting mistakes are more likely for more complex firms.   
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 Regulators’ recent concern about complexity in financial reporting is predicated 
on the belief that complexity is costly to the financial markets.  In regard to one particular 
cost, in December 2005 both Chairman Cox of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and Chairman Herz of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
suggested complex accounting and reporting was a major contributor to the increase in 
financial statement misreporting (Cox, 2005 and Herz, 2005).  I investigate the effect of 
accounting complexity on financial statement misreporting, a question largely unexplored 
in the academic literature.  I use revenue recognition as a setting to investigate this effect 
for three reasons.  First, revenue recognition is a universal accounting issue that affects 
many, if not all, firms.  In addition, prior research shows that revenue misreporting is a 
common type of restatement (Palmrose et al., 2004; GAO, 2002 and 2006), ensuring I 
can obtain a sufficiently large sample to test the effects of complexity on misreporting.  
Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that revenue recognition can be complex for firms 
(Sondhi and Taub, 2006; Herz, 2007; Turner, 2001).   
I define accounting complexity as the amount of uncertainty related to the 
mapping of transactions (or potential transactions) and standards into financial 
statements.1  This definition incorporates complexity relevant to both preparers and users 
of financial statements.  The uncertainty could result from unpredictable business 
                                                 
1 Prior literature has not developed a formal definition of accounting complexity.  While the SEC has been 
consistent in their discussion of complexity in SEC speeches and testimony, to my knowledge they have yet 
to formally define the concept. 
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environments, imperfect standards, or imperfect information about transactions.  I 
conjecture that a description of the revenue recognition process captures aspects of this 
uncertainty.  Therefore, I measure accounting complexity as it relates to revenue 
recognition using a factor score based on the number of words and number of revenue 
recognition methods from the firm’s revenue recognition disclosure.   
 There are two competing (although not exclusive) theories about how accounting 
complexity might affect financial misreporting.  The ‘mistake theory’, adapted from 
Dechow and Dichev (2002), argues that complexity causes managers to make more 
mistakes or errors in judgment.  When accounting is complex, managers are more likely 
to err when applying standards to transactions, increasing the likelihood of misreporting 
due to mistakes.  The ‘manipulation theory’ argues that managers take advantage of 
complex accounting to manipulate the financial statements.  For example, prior research 
suggests that investors do not fully understand information found in pension footnotes, 
and that managers manage earnings through complex pension accounting (Picconi, 2004; 
Bergstresser et al., 2006).  Therefore, the manipulation theory suggests complex 
accounting provides managers an opportunity to manage the financial statements more 
easily.   
In the context of revenue, both theories suggest that revenue recognition 
complexity likely increases the propensity to misreport revenue.  Assuming the 
probability of detection is similar across theories, I hypothesize that revenue recognition 
complexity increases the likelihood of revenue restatements.  I then attempt to distinguish 
between the mistake theory and manipulation theory.  The distinguishing feature between 
the two theories hinges on management’s intent.  I attempt to infer intent by testing 
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certain attributes of the misreporting: (1) whether the misreporting caused the firm to 
meet a revenue benchmark, (2) whether the misreporting was an overstatement of 
revenue, and (3) whether the misreporting included multiple areas of the financial 
statements.  To further test for intent, I examine the consequences of restating.  Prior 
research provides evidence that misreporting costs are more severe if information related 
to the restatement calls into question the integrity of management (see Palmrose et al., 
2004 and Hribar and Jenkins, 2004).  Therefore, conditional on misreporting, the 
consequences of restatement should be more severe for intentional manipulation than for 
unintentional mistakes.  An association between revenue recognition complexity and the 
consequences of misreporting provides an indication of intentional misreporting for 
complex firms.  I examine three consequences associated with the restatement: (1) the 
likelihood of an SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER), (2) the 
restatement announcement returns, and (3) CEO turnover following the restatement.   
  I test my hypotheses on a sample of 348 revenue restatements from 1997-2005 
identified by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in their 2002 and 2006 
reports to Congress on accounting restatements.  In order to test whether revenue 
recognition complexity is an important determinant of restating revenue, I compare firms 
restating revenue to two sets of control, or comparison, firms: 1) firms that had a 
restatement during the sample period, but restate did not restate revenue (i.e., the firm 
restated expenses only; hereafter referred to as non-revenue restatements) and 2) a 
matched sample of firms that do not have a restatement of any kind during the sample 
period.  I use both control samples because they offer complementary strengths and 
weaknesses in testing my hypotheses.  I use non-revenue restatement firms for 
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comparison principally because it provides an inherent control for determinants of 
restatement in general.  I employ a matched sample design because it provides a more 
accurate estimate of the effect of complexity on misreporting relative to non-restating 
firms.  Using these samples, I estimate a logistic regression model to test whether revenue 
recognition complexity increases the likelihood of a revenue restatement.  All the logistic 
regression results provide evidence that firms with complex revenue recognition are more 
likely to restate revenue.  Depending on the sample, a one standard deviation increase in 
revenue recognition complexity centered on the mean increases the probability of 
revenue misreporting by 8.8 to 21.7 percent.  Relative to other determinants in the 
models, this marginal effect suggests complexity is one of the most important 
determinants of revenue restatements.  
I then examine whether complex revenue recognition for firms that misreport 
revenue is associated with restatement attributes that suggest manipulation (missing 
benchmarks, overstatements, and restating multiple items).  Results from these tests do 
not differentiate between the mistake and manipulation theories for complex revenue 
recognition firms.  However, tests that examine the consequences of misreporting provide 
evidence consistent with the mistake theory.  Regression results show that, given a 
revenue restatement, firms with more complex revenue recognition are less likely to 
receive an AAER and have less negative restatement announcement returns.  However, 
the results show that revenue recognition complexity is not associated with CEO 
turnover, suggesting that boards may not distinguish between mistakes and manipulation 
in determining CEO departure when restatements occur.  In sum, my results provide 
evidence that accounting complexity increases the probability of restatement in the case 
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of revenue.  While there is no evidence consistent with the manipulation theory, I do 
provide some evidence consistent with the mistake theory. 
In additional analysis, I also perform a number of robustness checks.  These 
include using alternative measures of revenue recognition complexity, testing for 
managerial discretion in disclosing revenue recognition procedures, and controlling for 
changes in the revenue recognition disclosure environment.  These additional tests 
provide results that are generally consistent with those presented in the main analysis. 
This study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, I present evidence 
that complex accounting increases the occurrence of misreporting, and most importantly, 
show that the magnitude of that effect is significant.  Second, prior research (e.g. 
Bergstresser et al., 2006) suggests that complexity is associated with earnings 
management or manipulation; however, I find no evidence of an association between 
accounting complexity and manipulation in this setting of revenue recognition.  Third, I 
provide a definition of accounting complexity and an associated empirical measure that 
can be applied in future research.  These results should be informative to both the SEC 
and FASB as they attempt to reduce complexity in financial reporting, including revising 
revenue recognition standards in the near future.2  This research should also be useful to 
investors, auditors, and firms to better understand the causes and consequences of 
revenue restatements.   
                                                 
2 Both the SEC and FASB have taken steps to address complexity.  On June 27, 2007, the SEC announced 
the establishment of an advisory committee with a goal of reducing unnecessary complexity in financial 
reporting and making information more useful and understandable for investors.  The FASB is readdressing 
specific accounting standards that are overly complex and has initiated an effort to develop an integrated 
codification of all existing accounting literature that would be available electronically.  In February, 2007 
the House of Representatives voted unanimously to require the SEC, PCAOB and FASB to report yearly on 




A few recent studies also examine the role accounting standards and the 
application of those standards play in financial statement misreporting.  Citing the need to 
understand the causes of restatements, Plumlee and Yohn (2008 WP) classify 
restatements as caused by either (1) a basic company error, (2) intentional manipulation, 
(3) transaction complexity or (4) some characteristic of the accounting standards.  Using 
a sample of restatements from 2003 to 2006, their results suggest that 57 percent of 
restatements during this period are the result of basic internal company errors, while 37 
percent were the result of some characteristic of the accounting standard.  One drawback 
from using this classification approach is that the delineation of causes between company 
errors, transaction complexity, and accounting standards is likely a murky line that can be 
easily influenced by differences in firm restatement disclosures.  Mergenthaler (2008 
WP) examines whether the consequences of firms receiving SEC AAERs are affected 
when the misreporting is associated with a rules-based versus a principles-based standard.  
While Mergenthaler uses a standards-approach, I study the effect of accounting 
complexity on misreporting at the firm level.  I believe this captures complexity more 
accurately because standards affect firms differently due to differences in contracts and 
transactions.  Finally, compared to these two papers, my study attempts to look at the 
effect of complexity very broadly and attempts to measure it objectively.   
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next chapter, I define accounting 
complexity and discuss the effect of complexity on misreporting.  Chapter 3 discusses the 
empirical setting and develops my hypotheses.  Chapter 4 discusses the sample, data, and 
empirical design.  Results are presented in Chapter 5, with some additional analysis 
presented at the end.  Chapter 6 concludes, including directions for future research.
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Chapter 2. Accounting Complexity 
2.1 Accounting Complexity Defined 
To my knowledge, no formal definition of accounting complexity exists in the 
literature.3  I define accounting complexity as the amount of uncertainty related to the 
mapping of transactions or potential transactions and standards into the financial 
statements.4  This definition is intended to apply to both preparers and users of financial 
statements, and views accounting complexity as a scale or relation.  I next discuss a few 
key points related to this definition to give some context.  
Accounting is the confluence of transactions or potential transactions and 
standards.  Preparers must take information about the firm’s transactions and guidance 
from standards and map the two to determine the appropriate accounting.  Users must 
also understand the mapping to interpret financial statements correctly.  In many cases, 
this mapping is very straightforward, leading to a single, generally accepted and 
understood accounting choice.  In other cases, there is uncertainty in the mapping, which 
can lead to potentially conflicting or erroneous accounting choices by preparers.  
                                                 
3 Prior research has examined firm or organization complexity (see Bushman et al. 2004), information 
complexity (see Plumlee, 2003), and information overload (see Schick et al., 1990 for a review), concepts 
not wholly unrelated to accounting complexity.  I also recognize other definitions of accounting complexity 
likely exist; however, none has been explicitly stated. 
4 I believe this definition is in line with Congress’ and the SEC’s recent characterization of complexity, 
which encompasses both complexity as it relates to disclosure (which affects users) and standards (which 
affects users and preparers).  For example, H.R. 755 passed by the House in February 2007, identifies 5 
major areas that the SEC, PCAOB, and FASB need to address, encompassing both disclosure and standards 
issues.  These are (1)  reassessing complex and outdated accounting standards; (2) improving the 
understandability, consistency, and overall usability of the existing accounting and auditing literature; (3) 
developing principles-based accounting standards; (4) encouraging the use and acceptance of interactive 
data; and (5) promoting disclosures in ‘plain English’. 
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Uncertainty also affects users since they must interpret how the mapping was performed 
based on limited disclosures.  While some sources of uncertainty can be mutual for both 
preparers and users, uncertainty can also differ across preparers and users of financial 
statements.  In some cases the mapping may be quite clear to preparers and auditors; 
however, uncertainty about the same transactions and standards can make accounting 
“appear” complex to users.5  Increased transparency or disclosure can alleviate some 
uncertainty for users in terms of how the mapping is performed by preparers.  However, 
increased transparency does not remove uncertainty regarding how the mapping should 
be performed by preparers. 
Uncertainty in applying standards to transactions could come from many 
sources.6  First, uncertainty could be the result of business environments that are not 
perfectly predictable.  While accounting standards could require certainty of outcomes 
before recognition in the financial statements, most standards incorporate some aspect of 
this uncertainty, requiring managers to make estimates and judgments.  Uncertainty could 
also result from flawed standards or deficient information about transactions.  Unclear or 
ambiguous wording, inconsistencies across standards, or detailed rules-based standards 
can all cause uncertainty related to the standards.7  Uncertainty could also stem from 
deficient information about transactions or contracts.  Although the firm may have all 
                                                 
5 While preparers and auditors are required to have some level of accounting expertise, there are no such 
requirements for investors.  The FASB’s SFAC 1 paragraph 36 acknowledges that users’ understanding of 
financial information “may vary greatly”, and that financial reporting should be accessible “to all—
nonprofessionals as well as professionals—who are willing to learn to use it properly” (FASB, 1978).  
6 I provide a discussion on the potential sources of uncertainty to facilitate understanding, but my tests do 
not allow me to distinguish between the sources of uncertainty.  However, understanding the precise causes 
of uncertainty may be important to regulators interested in eliminating avoidable sources of uncertainty. 
7 There is much discussion in the accounting literature on rules- v. principles-based accounting standards.  
While the intent of rules-based standards may be to remove uncertainty in the accounting, they can increase 
accounting complexity for users because of their inability to encompass all potential situations or their 
ability to obscure the original transaction's purpose beneath layers of rules.  
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available information related to contracts and transactions, the lack of systems to access 
that information could cause uncertainty to still persist for preparers.  Uncertainty about 
contracts and transactions can increase for firms with numerous, customer-specific 
contracts or agreements documented by multiple contracts.  Lengthy contracts and 
technical or legal wording in contracts may also cause uncertainty.  In multi-division 
firms, uncertainty may increase because detailed information about contracts and 
transactions may be decentralized, while accounting expertise may be centralized.   
Uncertainty is the result of, or is amplified by, limits to human cognitive function.  
Research shows that individuals have limits to cognitive processing, especially under 
uncertainty, which leads to simplification, heuristics, or biases (see Payne, 1976; Iselin, 
1988; Bettman et al., 1990).  As argued by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), this 
simplification can occasionally lead to errors in estimation or judgment.  If uncertainty 
limits the efficient processing of information for preparers and/or users, this suggests that 
complexity can be costly to financial markets.  I discuss one of these costs, misreporting, 
in the next section. 
2.2 Accounting Complexity and Misreporting 
 I present two theories regarding the causes and consequences of accounting 
complexity on misreporting.  One theory of accounting complexity suggests that 
complexity from the preparer’s perspective causes unavoidable mistakes in financial 
reporting.  This idea is adapted from Dechow and Dichev (2002), who write that 
“estimation accuracy [of accruals] depends on firm characteristics like complexity of 
transactions and predictability of the firm’s environment.”  Although Dechow and Dichev 
focus on accruals, the idea applies more generally to all accounting and reporting.  
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Uncertainty in estimating accruals naturally leads to errors, which causes revision in 
future accruals and earnings.  More generally, preparer uncertainty in mapping 
transactions and standards also leads to more errors and misreporting.  However, unlike 
accruals, if the company makes errors when mapping transactions and standards 
(misinterpreting GAAP), the company must restate prior numbers.  I term this the 
mistake theory of complexity.  
Another theory of complexity suggests that managers opportunistically manage 
earnings when accounting is complex.  In contrast to the mistake theory, which suggests 
that complexity affects the preparer’s accuracy in financial reporting, the manipulation 
theory relies on complexity creating uncertainty for investors (and/or information 
intermediaries).  For example, focusing on complex pension accounting, Picconi (2004) 
documents that investors and analysts do not understand the effect of changes in pension 
plan parameters on future earnings.  He also shows that managers increase expected rates 
of return on pension assets to offset the effect of anticipated bad news in the future.  
Similarly, Bergstresser, Desai and Rauh (2006) show that managers increase rates of 
return assumptions on pension assets when the assumptions have a greater impact on 
earnings, or when managers are attempting to acquire other firms or exercise stock 
options.  The findings on pensions suggest managers opportunistically alter financial 
reporting when accounting or reporting is complex.  The manipulation theory argues that 
complexity increases uncertainty to outsiders, providing managers an opportunity to 
intentionally misreport more easily.8  
                                                 
8 Although this theory suggests managers take advantage of complex accounting by managing the financial 
statements, complexity is not a necessary condition for manipulation.  Many fraudulent practices are 




Chapter 3. Setting and Hypotheses 
 
3.1 Revenue Recognition Setting 
 I study the effect of accounting complexity on misreporting with respect to 
revenue recognition for three reasons.  First, revenue recognition is a universal 
accounting issue; therefore, my findings will apply to a broad set of firms.  Second, 
revenue misreporting is one of the most common types of restatement (see Palmrose et 
al., 2004; GAO, 2002 & 2006).  This ensures that I can obtain a sufficiently large sample 
of revenue misreporting to test the effects of complexity on misreporting.  Finally, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that revenue recognition can be complex for preparers and 
users of financial statements.  I briefly discuss the evidence on the complexity of revenue 
recognition next.   
Sondhi and Taub (2006) summarize the problems with revenue recognition when 
they write: “The lack of comprehensive guidance, in combination with the variety and 
complexity of revenue transactions, has resulted in a large number of financial reporting 
errors in the area of revenue recognition.”  Revenue recognition can be complex because 
of uncertainty about both standards and transactions.  From 2001-2005, the FASB’s 
advisory group named revenue recognition the top issue that should be addressed by the 
FASB (Schneider, 2005).  The FASB states there are over 200 revenue recognition 
pronouncements by various standard setting bodies (Herz, 2007), and much of the 
authoritative guidance is industry- or transaction-specific.  These issues can lead to 
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inconsistencies across pronouncements or difficulties in applying multiple standards to a 
contract.  In addition, complicated revenue transactions and contracts can increase 
uncertainty.  Customer contracts can be lengthy, filled with legal wording, and include 
multiple clauses for customer acceptance, return policies, and payment terms.  
Companies with many customer-specific contracts can increase uncertainty and side 
agreements, whether written or oral, can also alter provisions in contracts leading to 
increased complexity (see Turner, 2001). 
3.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis Development 
Both the mistake and manipulation theory of complexity suggest that revenue 
recognition complexity increases the likelihood of misreporting revenue.  Assuming that 
the probability of detecting the misreporting is similar across both theories, this leads me 
to the following hypothesis, stated in alternate form: 
H1:  Managers of firms with more complex revenue recognition are more likely to 
misreport revenue than managers of firms with less complex revenue recognition. 
Even though both the mistake and manipulation theories lead to the prediction in H1, the 
null hypothesis of no result could obtain if the effect of complexity on revenue 
misreporting were small or if misreporting is solely driven by managerial incentives and 
governance, as hypothesized in prior literature (see Zhang, 2006; Callen et al., 2005).  
Since I control for the incentives and governance related to misreporting using two 
approaches, these effects should not be reflected in the coefficient on complexity.  In 
addition, testing H1 allows me to quantify the economic significance of the effect of 
complexity on the likelihood of misstating revenue. 
 I next attempt to distinguish between the two theories of misreporting.  The 
research question I investigate is: Is misreporting revenue in a complex revenue 
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recognition environment the result of intentional manipulation or unavoidable mistakes?  
I do not provide specific hypotheses regarding this research question, but I develop tests 
to distinguish between the two competing theories.  The distinguishing feature between 
manipulation and mistakes is managerial intent.  Although inferring intent is difficult in 
an empirical setting, I conduct tests on both the attributes and consequences of 
misreporting to infer which theory best explains revenue misreporting.  I discuss these 
tests in the next section after a brief discussion of the sample.
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Chapter 4. Sample Selection and Empirical Design 
4.1 Data and Sample Selection 
To examine the effect of complexity on misreporting, I use a sample of revenue 
restatement firms collected by the GAO for their reports to Congress in 2002 and 2006.9  
Included in the GAO database is the date of the restatement announcement, type of 
restatement, including whether the firm restated revenue, and who identified the 
misreporting (or source).  The GAO study excludes certain types of restatements that are 
not due to “irregularities,” including restatements from mergers and acquisitions, 
discontinued operations, and stock splits, among others.  In the combined reports the 
GAO identified 738 firms that restated their revenue, covering the years 1997 to 2005.  I 
exclude financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) as their revenue recognition is substantially 
different from other firms due to regulatory requirements.  Firms may have multiple 
restatements over the sample period.  I only include the first restatement for firms that 
restated more than once within a one year period.10  I recategorize 18 revenue 
restatements identified by the GAO because they are categorized incorrectly.  For 
example, the GAO categorizes restatements relating to non-operating gains on sale and 
other non-operating income (such as interest income) as revenue restatements.  I also 
                                                 
9 Restatement data from the GAO reports can be found at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03395r.pdf 
(2002 report) and http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gao-06-1079sp/toc.html (2006 report).  Judson Caskey 
provides the data in one MS-Excel file here: http://personal.anderson.ucla.edu/judson.caskey/data.html.  
10 The GAO sample may have firms with multiple restatements within a one year period for two reasons.  
First, although extremely rare, the firm may have separately identified multiple misreporting violations 
during that one-year period.  More commonly, the firm has multiple restatements because the GAO 




exclude all revenue restatements in connection with SAB 101 or any EITF related to 
revenue issued during the sample period, as I consider these restatements as mandatory 
restatements caused by a change in accounting standard.11  Missing variables from 10-K 
disclosures and Compustat and CRSP databases reduces the revenue restatement sample 
to 348 observations.  Table 1 describes the attrition of the revenue restatement sample 
and the comparison samples described below. 
 
4.1.1 Control Firms for H1 
 I test whether revenue recognition complexity increases the probability of 
misreporting revenue (H1) using two different small sample comparison groups.12  This 
joint testing approach improves confidence in the combined results of the tests because of 
the unique strengths and weaknesses of each comparison sample.    
For the first comparison sample, I compare the revenue recognition complexity of 
firms that restated revenue to firms that also had a restatement during the sample period, 
but restated something other than revenue.  This design is advantageous because it 
inherently controls for incentives, governance effects, and other determinants of 
restatements, which are difficult to control for because they are hard to measure (e.g., 
governance and incentives).  The main disadvantage of using non-revenue restatement 
firms for comparison is that results may not accurately estimate the full effect of 
complexity, incentives or governance on misreporting relative to non-restating firms.  
This comparison sample is also obtained from the GAO reports, with 1,567 non-revenue 
                                                 
11 During the sample period, the Emerging Issues Task Force issued EITFs 99-19, 00-10, 00-14, 00-22, 00-
25 to clarify revenue recognition issues such as recognizing gross v. net, shipping and handling costs, sales 
incentives, and other consideration from a vendor to a reseller. 
12 Although the ideal design would be to compare revenue restating firms to a broad cross section of firms, 
this approach is prohibitive because revenue recognition complexity requires some hand collection.   
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restatements obtained from the reports.  As with the revenue restatement sample, I 
exclude financial firms and firms with more than one restatement in a one-year period.  I 
also exclude any restatements for firms that have a revenue restatement over the sample 
period to ensure that a single firm cannot be in both samples.  The final comparison 
sample is 840 restatements.     
In addition to the non-revenue restatement firms, I also compare the revenue 
restatement firms to a matched control sample of firms that did not have a restatement 
over the sample period.  A matched sample approach is advantageous because it allows 
me to estimate the full effect (i.e., magnitude) of complexity on misreporting.  Of course, 
this depends on measuring all the control variables accurately and imposes additional 
data limitations on the sample.  In addition, the matched sample design is not 
straightforward to implement because it is not clear how the match should be performed.   
For example, matching on industry introduces a noisy sort on revenue recognition 
complexity, potentially controlling for the effect being tested.  I choose to match on fiscal 
year, assets, and the book-to-market ratio.  Because my sample of revenue restatement 
firms are generally smaller firms, matching on assets and book-to-market ensures the 
firms are similar size and have similar growth prospects.  I first identify all firms without 
any restatement during the sample period that have data coverage on Compustat and 
Execucomp.  Firms with assets between 70% and 130% of the assets of the sample firm 
in the same fiscal year are chosen as potential matches.  From this set of firms, I choose 
the matched firm with the book-to-market ratio closest to that of the sample firm.  This 
process yields 338 matched sample firms.  Missing financial and stock return data 
requirements reduces the matched sample to 316 firms.  Finally, the research design 
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using the matched sample ideally includes a measure of compensation incentives.  The 
specifics of this measure are discussed in more detail in Section 4.3.2.  Due to data 
limitations, including this measure in the model reduces the sample size, resulting in only 
102 revenue restatements and 102 matched firms with necessary data. 
 All financial data is obtained from Compustat.  I obtain stock returns from CRSP 
and analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S.  Option compensation data is obtained from 
Execucomp.  CEO turnover is also obtained from Execucomp where available and hand 
collected from the proxy filings where not available.   
Table 2 displays the frequency of restatements by year for the type of restatement 
(Panel A), industry (Panel B), and source of the restatement (Panel C).13  Panel A shows 
that revenue restatement firms are 29 percent of the total restatements in the sample and 
that 2000 and 2003 had especially high proportions of revenue restatements.  Panel B 
displays the number of revenue/non-revenue restatements by year in each industry.  
Although not tabulated, the combined industry breakdown shown in Panel B is similar to 
the composition of all firms in Merged CRSP/Compustat database over the sample 
period, except my sample is overweighted in Wholesale/Retail and Technology and 
underweighted in Other.14  Panel C presents information about who identified the 
misreporting (or source) broken out by the type of restatement.  It is interesting to note 
that more than half of the restatements are initiated by the company for both revenue and 
non-revenue restatement firms. 
                                                 
13 Consistent with Palmrose et al. (2004), industries are defined by the following SIC codes: Mining & 
construction=0-1999, manufacturing=2000-3999 (except codes assigned to technology), technology=3570-
3579 plus 7370-7379, transportation=4000-4799, communications=4800-4899, utilities=4900-4999, 
wholesale/retail=5000-5999, services=7000-8999 (except codes assigned to technology), and other=9000-
9999. 
14 The overweighting in Wholesale/Retail is mostly explained by the large amount of lease-related 
restatements in 2005 for Wholesale/Retail firms. 
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4.2 Measuring Revenue Recognition Complexity 
 Because my definition of accounting complexity is built on the concept of 
uncertainty, this suggests that using a firm-level proxy of uncertainty might be 
appropriate for empirical testing.  However, many of the well-documented empirical 
measures of uncertainty such as bid-ask spread, standard deviation of returns, and 
dispersion of analyst forecasts capture uncertainty relative to the whole firm and markets 
it engages in.  Using a measure that captures this much uncertainty would almost 
assuredly drown out any uncertainty related to the mapping of revenue transactions and 
standards.  However, a firm-level proxy is more appropriate than a standards-level proxy 
because standards apply to firms differently due to differences in transactions.  I 
conjecture that a description of the revenue recognition practices captures uncertainty 
about recognizing revenue.  To measure the complexity of revenue recognition at the firm 
level, I examine the firm’s revenue recognition disclosures found in the summary of 
significant accounting policies contained in the notes to the financial statements.15  I 
collect revenue recognition disclosures contained in the firm’s most recent 10-K prior to 
the restatement announcement using the Edgar Company Search on the SEC website.16   I 
use the Python programming language to obtain the revenue recognition disclosures 
where possible, personally checking for accuracy, and hand collecting the disclosures 
where Python fails.  I measure revenue recognition complexity using a factor score 
(RRC SCORE) based on the number of words (WORDS) and a proxy for the number of 
                                                 
15 Prior to SAB 101, firms had a choice to disclose their revenue recognition policy depending on whether 
they thought it was a significant policy; however, SAB 101, which became effective in 2001, required firms 
to disclose their revenue recognition policies in the notes to the financial statements.  I discuss the effect of 
this change in disclosure requirements on my results in additional analysis in Chapter 5. 
16 Some restatements relate to quarterly filings only; however, revenue recognition disclosures are not 
found in 10-Q filings, so I also use the most recent 10-K filings for these firms. 
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methods (METHODS) obtained from the revenue recognition disclosure.17 ,18  I use a 
factor score mainly for presentation purposes, but also to reduce noise relative to using 
each measure separately.   
I believe RRC SCORE is a sufficient measure of revenue recognition complexity.  
Relative to simple disclosures, longer disclosures and more methods capture the 
preparer’s need to incorporate a diverse set of transactions and standards and reflect the 
manager’s need to explain more involved practices or methods.19  These characteristics 
are evidence of increased uncertainty.  To illustrate this, Appendix 1 includes a few 
sample revenue recognition disclosures.  For example, A.C. Moore Arts & Crafts 
recognizes revenue at the point of retail sale, which is likely an automated process with 
no uncertainty, suggesting low complexity.  The number of words in their revenue 
recognition disclosure is 8 and the number of methods is 1.  On the other hand, ARI 
Networks recognizes revenue for maintenance fees, services, subscriptions, and software.  
The fees may not be fixed and the customer acceptance terms can differ across contracts.  
For ARI, the number of words is 158 and the number of methods is 7.  Thus, relative to 
A.C Moore, ARI Networks’ revenue recognition is more complex and the RRC SCORE 
will capture that increased complexity.   
                                                 
17 I measure the number of methods (METHODS) the firm employs by counting the number of occurrences 
of the words “recogn” and “record” found in the disclosure.  Counting the occurrences of “recogn” and 
“record” overestimates the actual number of revenue recognition methods the firm employs.  To alleviate 
concerns of bias in this measure, I physically read the recognition disclosures and counted the number of 
methods for a sub-sample of firms.  The correlation between the two measures is .77, suggesting my proxy 
for the number of methods is sufficient. 
18 I use the principal components method of factor analysis, although results are very similar when I use the 
common factor method.  Only one retained factor is available when using two individual variables and the 
eigenvalue of my retained factor is 1.7.  
19 As with any measure based on disclosures, managers have discretion as to how much to disclose.  I 
conduct additional tests in Chapter 5 to determine if managers of revenue restating firms are manipulating 
disclosures to appear more or less complex. 
 
20 
Table 3 presents summary statistics on revenue recognition disclosures for my 
samples.  Panel A provides revenue recognition disclosure summary statistics for the 
revenue restatement sample and both comparison samples.  RRC SCORE is calculated for 
each combined sample and produces a score that is mean zero.  The t-tests reveal that 
revenue restatement firms have higher WORDS (diff. of 81.1 and 93.3, t-stats of 5.26 and 
5.70) and METHODS (diff. of 1.85 and 1.76, t-stats of 6.82 and 5.55) than both sets of 
comparison firms, resulting in higher RRC SCORES also (diff. of 0.63 and 0.61, t-stats of 
7.92 and 5.99).  These univariate results are consistent with H1.  Panel B shows the mean 
and median WORDS and METHODS for the revenue and non-revenue restatement firms 
and matched sample firms by industry.  These results reveal that revenue recognition 
disclosures vary by industry.  As might be expected, technology, services, and 
communications firms appear to have longer disclosures than the other industries.  The 
data in Panel B also shows the increased revenue recognition complexity for revenue 
restaters documented in Panel A does not apply equally to all industries.  For example, 
revenue restatement technology firms have lower mean WORDS than non-revenue 
restatement technology firms, but a higher mean than the matched sample technology 
firms. 
4.3 Empirical Design to test H1 
   I use two similar research designs (with slightly different control variables) to test 
H1 using the restatement and matched comparison samples.  Both the restatement design 
and matched-sample design are based on the following generic model and estimated 
using a logistic regression: 
)ControlsSCORERRC()Restate Revenue( γβα ∑++= fP   (1) 
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The details of each model are discussed next, including control variables.  Detailed 
variable definitions can also be found in Appendix 2. 
 
4.3.1 Restatement Design 
 Using the generic model in equation (1), the dependent variable in the comparison 
of revenue and non-revenue restatement firms is one if the firm restated revenue and zero 
if the firm restated something other than revenue.  Therefore, control variables need only 
measure any incremental determinants for why managers might misreport revenue.  I 
organize my discussion of control variables into three categories based on prior research: 
(1) value relevance (2) governance and (3) other.  I discuss them below.  
Value-relevance of revenue 
The two principal studies on revenue restatements, Zhang (2006) and Callen et al. 
(2005), have shown value relevance to be an important determinant of firms restating 
revenue.  I use firm characteristics based on this prior research that suggest revenue has 
high value relevance and/or earnings has low value relevance.  Ertimur et al. (2003) find 
the market reaction to revenue surprises to be greater for growth firms than value firms.  
Also, Ertimur and Stubben (2005) show that analysts are more likely to issue revenue 
forecasts for firms with higher growth prospects.  Therefore, the existence of revenue 
forecasts should also increase the value relevance of revenue, since it provides the market 
a benchmark to evaluate revenue.20   
Revenue may also be more important for valuation when net income is less value 
relevant.  Hayn (1995), Collins et al. (1999) and others have shown that the returns-
                                                 
20 Zhang (2006) includes 3 other value relevance variables that I do not include in the paper to make the 
model more parsimonious.  These include variables that measure the operating and gross margin of the firm 
and the R&D expense.  Including these variables in the model does not change the results presented in the 
paper and are not significant in any of the regressions. 
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earnings relationship is weaker for loss firms than profit-making firms.  Since loss firms 
have low value relevance of earnings, Callen et al. (2005) argue the market will substitute 
revenue for earnings in valuation.   Zhang (2006) also argues that high earnings volatility 
is also likely to make earnings less value relevant, potentially increasing the value 
relevance of revenue. 
In summary, growth prospects, analyst revenue forecasts, losses, and high 
earnings volatility all increase the value-relevance of revenue and the probability of 
revenue misreporting.  Therefore, I include proxies in my model to control for these 
constructs.  I use the book-to-market ratio of the firm at the fiscal year end just prior to 
the restatement (BTM) as a proxy for growth and an indicator equal to one if the firm has 
an analyst revenue forecast any time prior to the restatement announcement and zero 
otherwise (SALEFCST).  Finally, I include the proportion of loss years to total years the 
firm has earnings data on Compustat (LOSSPER), and the 5-year average earnings 
volatility (EARNVOL) of the firm prior to the restatement announcement.21     
Governance   
Prior research provides some evidence on the effect of auditing and governance 
on the occurrence of misreporting the financial statements in general (see Defond and 
Jiambalvo, 1991 and Palmrose et al., 2004), but provides little insight to whether 
managers will specifically misreport revenue.  It is more likely that the previously 
mentioned variables on the value-relevance of revenue already capture an increasing 
monitoring effect on revenue reporting by auditors.  In addition, Kinney and McDaniel 
                                                 
21 Zhang (2006) measures these variables relative to the initial period of misreporting.  I measure the 
variables relative to the restatement announcement because I only have data on the misreporting period for 
a sub-sample of restatements.  However, results are consistent with those presented in the paper when I 
measure these variables using Zhang’s approach on the sub-sample. 
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(1989) find that firms correcting previously reported quarterly earnings are more likely to 
have negative stock returns leading up to the correction.   They argue that poor recent 
performance causes auditors to scrutinize financial statements and accounting choices.  I 
include the stock returns for the 12 months prior to the restatement announcement 
(PRERETURN) to control for this effect.  Modifying this same idea specifically for 
revenue restatements, recent sales declines may cause auditors to reexamine the revenue 
recognition of prior sales, increasing the likelihood of restatement.  I control for 
deteriorating sales by using the average change in sales for the two years prior to the 
restatement (CHSALES).  I control for other potential monitoring effects by including the 
logged market value of equity of the firm at the fiscal year end just prior to restatement 
(LOGMVE), an indicator equal to one if the firm is audited by a large accounting firm 
(BIGN), and an indicator equal to one if the restatement is attributed to the auditor 
(AUDITOR). However, I make no predictions regarding these effects. 
Other determinants 
Zhang (2006) also argues that large accounts receivable accruals allow managers 
more flexibility in managing revenue.  Manipulating revenue when A/R accruals are 
already large decreases the likelihood of detection compared to small A/R accruals.  I 
include the firm’s 5-year average A/R Accrual prior to the restatement to control for high 
A/R accruals (AR ACCRUAL).  Zhang makes a similar argument for unearned revenue 
accruals, but since data on unearned revenue accruals is only extensively available 
starting in 2002, I do not include unearned revenue accruals in the formal analysis.22  
                                                 
22 As a robustness check, I include in the test an indicator equal to one if the firm has unearned A/R 




Finally, I include industry and year indicators to control for industry and year effects that 
may affect the probability of restatements. 
 
4.3.2 Matched Sample Design 
 The dependent variable using the matched sample design is one if the firm 
restated revenue and zero if the firm did not have a restatement.  In contrast with the 
previous model, control variables in this model should also capture any additional 
determinants for why managers might misreport the financial statements.  Prior literature 
identifies a number of determinants for why managers might misreport.  Burns and Kedia 
(2006) provide a summary of these determinants in their study that examines the effect of 
CEO compensation on misreporting.  Using a sample of S&P 500 firms, Burns and Kedia 
(2006) find evidence that the sensitivity of CEO option portfolios to stock price is higher 
for restatement firms than non-restatement firms, suggesting that compensation 
incentives matter to misreporting.   
I begin by including the same control variables used in the restatement research 
design as described in 4.3.1.  I include additional control variables from Burns and Kedia 
(2006) to capture incentives related to growth, external financing, violating debt 
covenants, and managerial equity incentives.  Specifically, I include the earnings-to-price 
ratio (EP) as another proxy for growth, cash raised from issuing equity or debt (DEBT 
ISSUE and EQUITY ISSUE), and leverage as a proxy for closeness to violating debt 
covenants (LEVERAGE).  I also include a measure of operating accruals (OP ACC), to 
accommodate the findings of prior research that misreporting firms have higher accruals 
(Dechow et al., 1996 and Richardson et al., 2003).  Finally, I include a measure of CEO 
equity incentives using the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO stock options (LOG 
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PPS) as described in Burns and Kedia (2006).  This variable measures the change in the 
value of stock options held for a percentage change in the value of the firm.  For revenue 
restatement firms, these variables are all measured as of the fiscal year just prior to the 
restatement announcement.  For matched firms, the variables are measured in the year in 
which the matched firm was matched on.  Again, details about variable definitions can be 
found in Appendix 2. 
 
4.4 Attributes of Misreporting Tests 
I examine three attributes of the revenue misreporting itself to provide some 
evidence on the intent of managers.  For each misreporting attribute indicator described 
below, I perform univariate logistic regressions to test whether revenue recognition 
complexity (RRC SCORE) is associated with the particular attribute. 
The first attribute I examine is meeting revenue benchmarks, including analyst 
forecasts and prior period revenue.  Meeting revenue benchmarks can be beneficial to the 
firm and provides incentives to manage revenue (see Ertimur et al., 2003; Rees and 
Sivaramakrishnan, 2007; Stubben, 2006).  If the restatement caused the firm to miss a 
benchmark that the firm previously beat, this suggests the manager chose the recognition 
of revenue to manipulate revenue to beat the benchmark.  Assuming the first period of 
misreporting was when the decision was made to recognize revenue in a particular way 
and the company maintained that policy in subsequent periods, the first period of 
misreporting is the period of interest.  For each restatement I set MISS GROWTH to one 
if the firm had previously recorded positive sales growth in the first period of 
misreporting and the restatement caused the firm to have zero or negative sales growth 
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for that period, and zero otherwise.23  Similarly, for each restatement I set MISS FCST to 
one if the first period of the misreporting had an analyst revenue forecast and (1) the firm 
had previously beat the mean analyst revenue forecast for that period, and (2) the 
restatement caused the firm to miss the forecast for that period, and zero otherwise. 
Second, if managers of firms with complex revenue recognition are manipulating 
revenue, there should be a greater likelihood that they overstate revenue compared to 
firms with less complex revenue recognition.  In the extreme, one might suggest that 
evidence of mistakes should only exist if there are an equal number of over- and 
understatements.  However, the probability of detection is not equal for over- and 
understatements because auditors and boards are more concerned with overstatements.  In 
addition, this test attempts to determine if complex revenue recognition is more 
associated with unintentional mistakes, not solely driven by unintentional mistakes.  I set 
an indicator equal to one if the sum of the restated revenue over the restating periods is 
less than the sum of the originally reported revenue over the restating period, and zero 
otherwise (OVERSTATEMENT).  
Finally, the pervasiveness of the restatement may also give an indication of intent.  
If the company restates another area of the financial statements in addition to revenue, it 
suggests the misreporting is widespread and more likely intentional.  In support of this, 
Palmrose et al. (2004) find that restatements involving multiple areas of the financial 
statements have more negative announcement returns, controlling for the magnitude of 
                                                 
23 Since companies can restate annual results and/or quarterly results, I determine sales growth differently 
for annual and quarterly periods.  For restated annual results, sales growth is calculated as the annual 
difference in sales.  For restated quarterly results, sales growth is calculated as the lagged 4-quarter 
difference in sales. 
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the restatement on net income.  I set an indicator equal to one if the firm restated multiple 
areas of the financial statements, and zero otherwise (MULTIPLE). 
 
4.5 Consequences of Misreporting Tests 
In addition to the attributes of misreporting, I examine the negative consequences 
associated with the misreporting to partly infer whether stakeholders perceive there to be 
managerial intent associated with complexity.  As Hribar and Jenkins (2004) argue, firms 
that announce restatements experience an increase in cost of capital partially because of 
uncertainty regarding managerial integrity.  More generally, if managerial intent is 
important to stakeholders when they observe misreporting, then the theories suggest the 
consequences of misreporting will be more severe if managers are taking advantage of 
complexity and less severe if the complexity just results in more errors.  I examine three 
reactions to misreporting that provide evidence of intent: SEC AAERs, restatement 
announcement returns, and CEO turnover following the restatement.24 
First, I examine whether an SEC Enforcement Action (AAER) accompanies the 
revenue restatement.25  While not all AAERs are accusations of fraud, the issuance of an 
AAER represents a greater likelihood of intentional actions.26  For example, Karpoff et 
al. (2007), find that 622 of the 788 enforcement actions (79 percent) in their sample from 
1978-2006 include charges of fraud.  In addition, a 2007 Deloitte study finds that of 
                                                 
24 Using a different approach, Hennes, Leone, and Miller (2007) classify a restatement as intentional if the 
restatement disclosure discusses an irregularity, a board-initiated independent investigation, or an external 
regulatory inquiry.  However, similar to my approach, they examine whether their classification is valid by 
examining the classification’s association to announcement returns and class action lawsuits.  
25I use the term ‘accompanies’ because the timing of restatements and AAERs can vary across firms.  SEC 
investigations into misreporting, whether formal or informal, typically closely accompany restatement 
announcements.  However, the complete resolution of restatements and AAERs can take years. 
26 Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2006) and Feroz et al. (1991) correctly argue that the SEC can issue 
administrative actions that do not imply charges of fraud or gross negligence. Generally, these 
administrative actions end with a settlement and an AAER, where the firm admits to no wrong-doing but 
agrees to avoid future securities violations. 
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revenue recognition AAERs, roughly half of the AAERs are issued for recording 
fictitious revenue, revenue swaps or round-tripping, or “bill and hold” transactions, which 
are all intentional manipulations (Deloitte Forensic Center, 2007).  I obtain data on firms 
subject to SEC AAERs from the sample of AAERs that Dechow et al. (2007) use in their 
study.  Using AAERs, Dechow et al. (2007) identify financial statement variables that 
predict financial manipulations and develop a Fraud Score based on their prediction 
model.  Their sample contains AAERs from 1982 through 2004 and identifies if the 
AAER relates to revenue or receivables issues.  Since my sample of restatements runs 
through 2005, I determine whether later restatements resulted in AAERs by searching the 
listings of AAERs on the SEC website through August 2007.     
I use estimates from a logistic regression to test whether revenue recognition 
complexity affects the likelihood of receiving an AAER for revenue restatement firms.  
The dependent variable is one if the firm has an AAER associated with revenue or 
receivables within three years of the restatement announcement and zero otherwise.  


















Generally, studies on AAERs (Dechow et al., 1996; Beniesh, 1999; Dechow et al., 
2007) have compared AAER firms to either a large sample of public firms or to small 
matched-samples.  These studies examine firm characteristics like governance, 
incentives, and financial statement characteristics to predict AAERs.  In contrast, this test 
 
29 
focuses on the likelihood of an AAER for a specific type of misreporting event; therefore, 
restatement characteristics are likely more important in determining if an AAER will be 
issued.  I conjecture that the SEC is more likely to issue an AAER if managers had intent 
to manipulate revenue, if the misstatements are large, and if the SEC gets greater 
exposure from issuing the AAER.  I include three variables to identify intent: (1) whether 
the firm restated more than just revenue (MULTIPLE); (2) whether the restatement is 
credited to the firm’s auditor (AUDITOR); and (3) a dummy equal to one if the 
restatement caused the firm to miss the sales forecast for the first period of the 
restatement and zero otherwise (MISS FCST).27  I include three measures of the 
magnitude of the restatement: (1) the number of periods the company is restating in 
quarters (RESTLEN); (2) the percentage change in revenue over all periods of the 
misreporting due to the restatement (CHREV); and (3) the percentage change in net 
income over all periods of the misreporting due to the restatement (CHNI).28  Finally, the 
SEC may target large firms and firms audited by large accounting firms because it 
benefits from enforcement of those firms relative to smaller firms.  To control for these 
effects, I include in the model both the log of the market value of equity for the fiscal 
year end prior to the restatement (LOGMVE) and whether the firm was audited by a large 
accounting firm (BIGN). 
 Recognizing that AAERs probably do not constitute a complete set of intentional 
misreporting violations, I examine two other events associated with the restatement, 
                                                 
27 Although the purpose of the test is to infer intent using the association between revenue recognition 
complexity and AAERs, I control for other obvious indications of intent since the SEC likely uses this 
other information in conjunction with complexity to determine if the company was intentionally 
misreporting revenue. 
28 The last two measures of magnitude, CHREV and CHNI will not capture restatements that are solely 
timing issues, since there is no “change” in revenue or net income.  However, few restatements can be 
categorized as solely revenue recognition timing problems because at the time of restatement the timing has 
not been fully resolved. 
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announcement returns and CEO turnover.  If investors are sensitive to management 
integrity and are capable (through disclosures or inference) of identifying managerial 
intent when a restatement is announced, then examining the effect of complexity on 
returns provides the market’s indication of intent.  If complex revenue recognition firms 
have lower (higher) market returns it would suggest the market interprets revenue 
restatements for complex firms as more (less) intentional. 
I test whether the market reaction to revenue restatement announcements differs 
based on revenue recognition complexity using OLS regression estimates of 5-day 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) centered on the announcement date regressed on 
complexity variables and other control variables.  I measure the cumulative abnormal 
return using market adjusted returns, where the daily market returns are subtracted from 
the firm’s raw returns and compounded over the period.  The model is presented in 














     (3) 
 
Palmrose et al. (2004) identify a number of restatement and firm characteristics 
that affect restatement announcement returns.  They show that restatement announcement 
returns are negatively associated with restatements involving fraud, affecting multiple 
accounts, decreasing net income, and attributed to auditors or management.  I control for 
these findings using MULTIPLE and AUDITOR as previously defined.  In addition, I 
include an indicator for whether the restatement is eventually associated with an AAER 
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(AAER) to identify fraud.  Since AAERs are not usually announced concurrently with 
accounting restatements, I include this variable to account for information the market 
infers or receives about fraud or SEC investigations from the announcement.  I control 
for the magnitude of the restatement by including both CHREV and CHNI as previously 
defined.  The model includes LOGMVE to control for size since adverse news is likely to 
be magnified for small firms, which typically have weak information environments 
(Collins et al., 1987 and Freeman, 1987).  Since announcement returns are partially due 
to investors’ revisions of future growth expectations, the returns are likely related to the 
book-to-market ratio of the firm just prior to the announcement (BTM) and recent stock 
performance (PRERETURN) as previously defined.   
Finally, I examine evidence from CEO turnovers to infer intent.  If corporate 
boards are more likely to dismiss CEOs that manipulate revenue, then an association 
between revenue recognition complexity and CEO turnover provides an indication of 
intent.  However, it is possible that boards do not distinguish between manipulation, an 
indication of CEO integrity, and mistakes, an indication of CEO competence, when 
making turnover decisions.  Therefore, I expect this test to be less powerful than the other 
consequences tests.  Consistent with Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (DHW, 2006), I test a 
logistic regression model where the dependent variable is one if the CEO resigned or was 
dismissed from the firm within two years following the restatement announcement and 
zero otherwise.  The model, presented in Equation (4), includes a number of control 





















Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006) identify a number of variables that are 
associated with CEO turnover following restatements, many of which I include as control 
variables in my model.  I include MULTIPLE and AAER as previously defined as partial 
controls for managerial culpability.  I control for firm size by including LOGMVE as 
previously defined.  I also include both CHREV and CHNI to capture the magnitude of 
the restatement.  Prior stock return and operating performance are directly linked with 
CEO turnover decisions (see Warner et al., 1988 and Engel et al., 2003).  Following 
DHW, I include both the stock returns for the year prior to (PRERETURN) and the year 
following (POSTRETURN) the restatement announcement to control for market-based 
performance.  Consistent with DHW, I also include the return-on-equity (ROA) for the 
fiscal year prior to the restatement announcement to control for operating-based 
performance.  Finally, I include the restatement announcement return (CAR) to capture 
the market’s assessment of the restatement.  DHW also provide some evidence that CEO 
age, tenure, stock ownership and occupying the Chairman position all contribute to the 
turnover.  However, since over half of my sample firms are not covered by Execucomp, I 
exclude these variables from the model.  I discuss the effect of this research design choice 
on my results in the next section.
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Chapter 5. Results and Robustness Checks 
5.1 Univariate Tests and Sample Correlations 
Table 4 contains summary statistics for revenue restatement firms and both sets of 
comparison firms, with t-tests for the difference in means.  The results for RRC SCORE 
are identical to those presented in Table 3 and were discussed in Section 4.2.  The 
differences in means show that revenue restatement firms have lower book-to-market 
(BTM) than non-revenue restatement firms but are not different than the matched sample 
firms.  This is expected since BTM was one of the match variables.  Revenue restatement 
firms have incurred more losses (LOSSPER), have lower returns in the year leading up to 
a restatement announcement (PRERETURN), and have larger A/R accruals 
(AR ACCRUAL) prior to the restatement announcement compared to both sets of 
comparison firms.  Revenue restatement firms have higher CHSALES compared to 
matched firms (0.21 vs. 0.09, t-stat 3.52), but there is no statistical difference in 
CHSALES relative to non-revenue restatement firms.  Matched sample firms are more 
likely to have a sales forecast (SALEFCST) and be audited by a large accounting firm 
(BIGN) compared to revenue restatement firms; however, non-revenue restatement firms 
are less likely to have a sales forecast and have the same proportion of firms audited by 
large accounting firms.  This is likely the result of matched sample firms being more 
established than non-revenue restatement firms because they are required to have data on 
Execucomp.  Finally, in Panel B, it appears that revenue restatement firms are more likely 
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to have issued debt or equity in the year prior to the restatement announcement compared 
to matched-sample firms.  
Table 5 presents sample correlations for both research designs for selected 
variables listed in Table 4.  As expected, RRC SCORE is positively correlated with the 
variable REVENUE, the dependent variable for both models, which is one if the firm 
restated revenue and zero otherwise.  Revenue recognition complexity is also positively 
correlated with LOSSPER and SALEFCST, suggesting that firms with complex revenue 
recognition also have revenue that is more value relevant. 
5.2 Results of Tests of H1 
5.2.1 Results of Restatement Research Design 
Table 6 presents results from the logistic estimation of the restatement research 
design.  I calculate Z-statistics for marginal effects using robust standard errors with firm-
level clustering to account for multiple observations for the same firm (93 cases).29  The 
first observation from Table 6 is that RRC SCORE has a positive, statistically significant 
coefficient (.347, z-stat 4.71) indicating that revenue recognition complexity increases the 
likelihood that a firm will restate revenue relative to other restatement firms.  This 
provides support for H1.  In addition, the results indicate that firms with lower BTM and 
firms with an analyst sales forecast (SALESFCST) are more likely to restate revenue.  
Multivariate results also suggest that revenue restatement firms are experiencing a 
decline in sales (CHSALES) and have poor stock return performance (PRERETURN) 
prior to the restatement announcement, suggesting performance plays a monitoring role.  
Revenue restatement firms are less likely to be audited by a large accounting firm, which 
                                                 
29 The z-statistics presented are for marginal effects only, but the z-statistics are almost identical for the 
coefficients in the model. 
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may suggest a lack of oversight of revenue restating firms’ auditors (i.e., the non-Big N 
auditors are less likely to uncover revenue restatement problems).  Finally, the coefficient 
of AR ACCRUAL is positive and significant (4.739, z-stat 3.05), indicating that revenue 
restating firms also have much larger A/R accruals prior to the restatement relative to 
other restatement firms.   
I examine the economic significance of complexity relative to other determinants 
of revenue restatements by computing marginal effects.  To facilitate comparing marginal 
effects across variables, marginal effects are calculated for each continuous variable as 
the change in the predicted probability as the variable moves one standard deviation 
centered at the mean, holding all other variables constant at their mean values.  Marginal 
effects for indicator variables are similarly calculated, but with the change in the 
predicted probability calculated as the indicator moves from zero to one.  A one standard 
deviation change in RRC SCORE (from -0.65 to 0.65) increases the probability of 
revenue restatement by 8.6 percent, which, in absolute terms, is greater than the marginal 
effect of any other continuous variable, and equal to or greater than all indicator 
variables.  However, in untabulated results, the marginal effect of RRC SCORE is not 
statistically different from the marginal effects of SALEFCST, PRERETURN, BIGN, or 
AR ACCRUAL.  Thus, while other determinants of misreporting are also important, 
revenue recognition complexity provides a significant effect on determining which firms 




5.2.2 Results of Matched-Sample Research Design 
 Table 7 presents results from the logistic estimation of the matched-sample 
research design.  Z-statistics and marginal effects are calculated the same as in Table 6.  
Three specifications are presented.  First, I estimate the model using only the relevant 
variables from the restatement model to allow for comparison to those results.30  The 
second specification includes additional controls for incentives that do not restrict the 
sample.  Finally, I add LOG PPS to control for compensation incentives, which reduces 
the sample due to data restrictions.  The first observation from Table 7 is that 
RRC SCORE has a positive, statistically significant coefficient for all three specifications, 
consistent with the findings in Table 6.  Consistent with the findings in Table 6, 
PRERETURN and BIGN have negative and significant coefficients.  However, CHSALES 
is now positive and significant, indicating that restating firms in general have higher sales 
growth than non-restating firms.  The added control variables in the second specification 
appear to control for additional determinants of restatements.  Both DEBT ISSUE and 
EQUITY ISSUE have positive and significant coefficients (0.95 and 0.59, z-stats of 2.05 
and 1.67), suggesting that revenue restatement firms access the equity and debt markets 
prior to a restatement announcement compared to matched-sample control firms.  The 
positive coefficient on OP ACC (1.745, z-stat 2.16) suggests that revenue restaters also 
have higher operating accruals than matched sample firms.  Turning to the third 
specification, many of the significant results disappear when I add LOG PPS to the 
model, most likely an indication of losing power due to the sample being restricted.  The 
estimates on marginal effects for the three specifications indicate that a one standard 
                                                 
30 The indicator variable AUDITOR from the restatement model is only measured if the firm had a 
restatement.  I exclude this variable from the matched-sample design because matched sample firms do not 
have a restatement.  
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deviation increase in complexity increases the probability of misreporting between 11.6 
and 21.7 percent.  As discussed in Section 4.1, comparing marginal effects for RRC 
SCORE in Tables 6 and 7 provides support for the contention that the effect of 
complexity on misreporting may not be estimated accurately using the restatement 
design.  Marginal effects in Table 7 are higher than those presented in Table 6, indicating 
that restatement firms in general have more complex revenue recognition than non-
restatement firms.  Overall, the combined results of Tables 6 and 7 provide evidence 
consistent with revenue recognition complexity increasing the probability of misreporting 
revenue, both statistically and economically. 
5.3 Attributes of Misreporting Results 
 The results of the attributes of misreporting tests are found in Table 8.  The table 
presents univariate logistic regression estimates of each misreporting attribute 
(MISS GROWTH, MISS FCST, OVERSTATEMENT, and MULTIPLE).  Z-statistics are 
presented below the coefficients, with statistical significance calculated using 2-tailed 
tests.  Although the coefficients on RRC SCORE are positive for each model, none are 
statistically significant at conventional levels.  Therefore, these results do not provide 
convincing evidence that managers of complex revenue recognition firms make more 
mistakes or are intentionally manipulating revenue.  However, the lack of results for 
these tests may indicate weaknesses in my proxies for intentional manipulation.  The 
attributes I use appear to be the most obvious, yet observable attributes related to 
intentional manipulation; however, it may be that more subtle or unobservable attributes 
of misreporting could provide better indications of manipulation. 
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5.4 Consequences of Misreporting Results 
Table 9 contains descriptive statistics for the sample of 348 revenue restatement 
firms (Panel A) and consequence variables broken down by high and low revenue 
recognition complexity (Panel B).  Panel A shows that 20 percent of all revenue 
restatements result in SEC AAERs and 31 percent of revenue restatement firms have 
CEO turnover in the two years following the restatement. The mean (median) 
announcement CAR is -10 percent (-5.4 percent), consistent with the findings in Palmrose 
et al. (2004).  The mean stock return for the year prior to the restatement is -19.1 percent 
and the mean return for the year following the restatement is -21.3 percent.  Restatement 
attributes show the mean number of quarters restated (RESTLEN) is 8.2, with a mean 
decrease in revenue (CHREV) of 5.7 percent and a mean decrease in earnings (CHNI) of 
13.4 percent.  In Panel B, the sample of revenue restatements are divided into high and 
low revenue recognition complexity based on RRC SCORE relative to the mean of 
RRC SCORE for the sample.  The results in Panel B show that high complex revenue 
recognition firms are less likely to receive an AAER (0.16 vs. 0.24, t-test  -1.82) and have 
less negative announcement returns (-0.08 vs. -0.119, t-test 1.78) than low complexity 
firms.  The t-test shows no significant difference for CEO turnover. 
Table 10 contains regression estimates for consequences of misreporting tests.  
The results on AAERs show RRC SCORE is negatively associated with AAERs (-0.385, 
z-stat -2.97), suggesting restatements involving complex revenue recognition are less 
likely intentional.  The results also show the SEC targets firms with larger market values 
(0.207, z-stat of 2.34).  CHREV has a negative coefficient (-3.475, z-stat of -3.08), which 
is expected if the SEC is more concerned with revenue overstatements.  More surprising, 
the coefficient on CHNI is 0.157 (significant at 5%).  However, this does not indicate that 
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earnings increases are most associated with AAERs, but suggests that, given the change 
in revenue, an increase in earnings is more associated with AAERs.  Therefore, these 
coefficients must be interpreted collectively. 
The results for announcement returns in Table 10 also show that firms with 
complex revenue recognition have less negative announcement returns (0.023, t-stat 
2.54).  The economic effect on returns is also significant.  Although not tabulated, a one 
standard deviation increase in RRC SCORE (1.22) increases announcement returns by 2.8 
percent.  With an average market capitalization of $1.9 billion prior to the restatement, 
the mean change in announcement return dollars is $52 million.  The CAR results also 
show that understatements of revenue (CHREV) have higher announcement returns, and 
firms that eventually receive AAERs have much lower restatement announcement returns 
(-12.1 percent).  As predicted, the coefficient on PRERETURN is also negative (-0.033, t-
stat -3.63), suggesting the market must lower expectations of future growth to a greater 
degree for firms with good recent stock performance.   
The final regression in Table 10 on CEO turnover also provides evidence 
generally consistent with the mistake hypothesis.  However, while the coefficient for 
RRC SCORE is negative (-0.212), it is insignificant at conventional levels (z-stat of -1.61 
or p-value of 0.108).  This may be resulting from one of two different effects.  First, the 
model may not be fully specified due to missing data on CEO characteristics like age, 
tenure and occupying the Chairman position as mentioned in Section 4.5; however, it 
seems unlikely that these variables are correlated with revenue recognition complexity, 
suggesting that the lack of specification may not influence the complexity coefficient.  
Second, as expected, it may be that complexity is not associated with CEO turnover 
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decisions because boards may not distinguish between mistakes and manipulation in 
determining CEO departure.  The regression results do indicate that CEO turnover is 
higher if the firm receives an AAER, has poor operating performance prior to the 
restatement (ROA) and poor stock returns following the restatement (POSTRETURN).  
Overall, the results in Table 10 provide evidence that revenue restatements resulting from 
complex revenue recognition have less severe consequences.   
5.5 Robustness Checks 
5.5.1 Other Measures of Revenue Recognition Complexity 
 To test the robustness of my proxy for revenue recognition complexity, I conduct 
all the previous tests using alternative proxies.  First, to control for the effect of multi-
division firms on the length of revenue recognition disclosures, I scale RRC SCORE by 
the number of operating segments obtained from the Compustat Segments Database.  
Firms with missing segment information are assumed to have a single business line.  
Results using this scaled complexity score are consistent with those presented in the main 
analysis.  Also, I conduct the tests using the individual variables WORDS and METHODS 
and results are substantively similar.  In addition, I develop a measure to capture the 
subjectivity of the revenue recognition methods employed by using key-word searches 
for the following practices: the percentage of completion method, providing multiple 
deliverables, vendor-specific objective evidence, barter or non-monetary exchange 
revenue, or fair valuing aspects of the contract.  While using this measure provides 
support for H1, it is insignificant in any of the tests to determine intent (attributes or 
consequences).  Finally, I conduct the analysis using a factor score obtained from 
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WORDS, METHODS, and the subjectivity measure.  Again, the results remain 
substantially unchanged from those presented in the main analysis.31   
 
5.5.2 Managerial Discretion and Revenue Recognition Disclosures 
As with any measure based on firm disclosures, there is managerial discretion 
about how much to disclose with respect to revenue recognition.  It may be that managers 
of firms use their discretion to disclose more to appear more complex, thereby making it 
more difficult to detect misreporting.  To alleviate concerns that managers may be 
manipulating revenue recognition disclosures prior to the restatement, and therefore 
affecting inferences using my measure of revenue recognition complexity, I also collect 
the revenue recognition disclosures found in the most recent 10-K filing just following 
the restatement announcement.  I conjecture that if managers are exhibiting discretion in 
their revenue recognition disclosures prior to the restatement, that the discretion will be 
reduced following the restatement due to auditor scrutiny accompanying the restatement.  
I collect these post-disclosures for both revenue restatement firms and non-revenue 
restatement firms so I can compare the changes in revenue recognition pre- and post-
restatement for both sets of firms.   
Table 11 presents the statistics for the pre- and post-restatement revenue 
recognition disclosures.32  As shown in the table, the revenue restatement firms have 
more WORDS and METHODS, and higher RRC SCORE than non-revenue restatement 
                                                 
31 Using this revenue recognition complexity factor score, the coefficient on RRC SCORE in Table 5 is 
0.283, with a marginal effect of 0.079 and Z-statistic of 4.22.  In Table 6, the coefficients for RRC SCORE 
are 0.308, 0.333, and 0.569 for the three specifications, with marginal effects of 0.114, 0.123, and 0.208 
and Z-statistics of 4.16, 4.38, and 3.59, respectively.  
32 The number of revenue and non-revenue restatement firms in Table 4 differs from those presented in 
prior tables due to the requirement to have post-restatement revenue recognition disclosure. 
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firms in both the pre- and post- periods.  This suggests that the difference in revenue 
recognition complexity for revenue restatement firms was not driven by managerial 
discretion and still exists post-restatement.  It is also interesting to note that for both the 
revenue restaters and non-revenue restaters, the number of WORDS and METHODS 
increased in the post period, but the increase was greater for the revenue restaters (102.1 
and 1.7 for revenue restaters; 38.7 and 0.5 for non-revenue restaters).  Therefore, it 
appears that while the revenue restatement firms had longer disclosures than non-revenue 
restatement firms prior to the restatement, even these longer disclosures did not 
adequately explain how the firm should have recognized revenue recognition.  
 
5.5.3 Regulations Affecting Revenue Recognition Disclosure 
 Effective in 2001, SAB 101 required disclosure of the firm’s revenue recognition 
policies and gave more substantive guidance related to the content of those disclosures.  
Since my proxy for revenue recognition complexity relies upon these disclosures, a 
positive association between complexity and misreporting may be due to a disclosure 
change and not a change in revenue recognition complexity.  I conduct all the tests 
splitting the sample into pre- and post-SAB 101 restatements.  All results are consistent 
with the results presented in the paper except results for RRC SCORE coefficients are 
insignificant for the AAER and CAR regressions in the pre-SAB 101 period.  Results 
remain consistent in the post-SAB 101 period: higher revenue recognition complexity is 
associated with fewer AAERs and less negative CARs.  The difference in results pre- and 
post-SAB 101 may suggest that lack of guidance in the pre-SAB 101 period caused firm 
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disclosures to be less reliable measures of the firm’s real revenue recognition polices, 
increasing noise in the measure of revenue recognition complexity in the pre-period. 
 
5.5.4 Exclusion of Lease-Related Restatements 
 Due to the large number of lease-related restatements in 2005 that some may 
consider a change in accounting policy, I re-estimate the logistic regression to test H1 
excluding these restatements.  I proxy for these lease restatements by excluding all 
restatements identified as “cost or expense” restatements in 2005 (198 cases).  Again, 
results are consistent with those presented in the main analysis.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
 I investigate the effect of accounting complexity on misreporting using a setting 
of revenue recognition complexity and revenue restatements.  Using two complementary 
research designs, I find that revenue recognition complexity significantly increases the 
probability of revenue misreporting.  Because complexity can lead to more mistakes 
and/or create opportunities for manipulation, I conduct two sets of tests to determine 
whether the increase in misreporting from complexity is likely the result of more 
mistakes or opportunistic behavior.  These tests examine both the attributes of the 
misreporting and the consequences of misreporting.  Tests on the attributes of 
misreporting do not provide clear evidence that managers of complex revenue firms are 
more likely to manipulate or make mistakes.  However, results are consistent with the 
consequences of misreporting being less severe - firms with complex revenue recognition 
have less negative announcement returns and are less likely to receive AAERs.  Finally, 
my analysis shows revenue recognition complexity is not associated with CEO turnover, 
suggesting that boards may not distinguish between mistakes and manipulation in 
determining CEO departure when restatements occur.   
 Collectively, the results suggest that in the case of revenue recognition, 
complexity is a major factor in the occurrence of misreporting.  This provides evidence 
consistent with accounting complexity being costly to financial markets, which lends 
support to regulators’ concerns about accounting complexity.  While there appears to be 
 
45 
no strong evidence of manipulation by firms with more complex revenue recognition, 
accounting complexity appears to be more associated with mistakes.  More research is 
needed to determine if accounting complexity increases misreporting in other areas 















Appendix 1  
 
Example Revenue Recognition Disclosures 
 
 
A.C. Moore Arts & Crafts, 2005 10-K 
Revenue is recognized at point of retail sale. 
 
UStel, Inc., 1997 10-K 
Revenue is recognized upon completion of the telephone call. 
 
Brooks Automation, 2002 10-K 
Revenue from product sales are recorded upon transfer of title and risk of loss to the customer 
provided there is evidence of an arrangement, fees are fixed or determinable, no significant 
obligations remain, collection of the related receivable is reasonably assured and customer acceptance 
criteria have been successfully demonstrated. Revenue from software licenses is recorded provided 
there is evidence of an arrangement, fees are fixed or determinable, no significant obligations remain, 
collection of the related receivable is reasonably assured and customer acceptance criteria have been 
successfully demonstrated. Costs incurred for shipping and handling are included in cost of sales. A 
provision for product warranty costs is recorded to estimate costs associated with such warranty 
liabilities. In the event significant post-shipment obligations or uncertainties remain, revenue is 
deferred and recognized when such obligations are fulfilled by the Company or the uncertainties are 
resolved. 
 
Revenue from services is recognized as the services are rendered. Revenue from fixed fee application 
consulting contracts and long-term contracts are recognized using the percentage-of-completion 
method of contract accounting based on the ratio that costs incurred to date bear to estimated total 
costs at completion. Revisions in revenue and cost estimates are recorded in the periods in which the 
facts that require such revisions become known. Losses, if any, are provided for in the period in which 
such losses are first identified by management. Generally, the terms of long-term contracts provide for 
progress billing based on completion of certain phases of work. For maintenance contracts, service 
revenue is recognized ratably over the term of the maintenance contract. 
 
In transactions that include multiple products and/or services, the Company allocates the sales value 
among each of the deliverables based on their relative fair values. 
 
ARI Network Services, Inc., 2001 10-K 
Revenue for use of the network and for information services is recognized in the period such services 
are utilized.  Revenue from annual or periodic maintenance fees is recognized over the period the 
maintenance is provided. Revenue from catalog subscriptions is recognized over the subscription 
term. 
 
The Company recognizes the revenue allocable to software licenses and specified upgrades upon 
delivery of the software product or upgrade to the end user, unless the fee is not fixed or determinable 
or collectibility is not probable. The Company considers all arrangements with payment terms 
extending beyond 12 months and other arrangements with payment terms longer than normal not to be 
fixed or determinable. If the fee is not fixed or determinable, revenue is recognized as payments 
become due from the customer. Arrangements that include acceptance terms beyond the Company's 
standard terms are not recognized until acceptance has occurred. If collectibility is not considered 





Variable Name Source Variable Definition 
WORDS Hand 
Collected 
The number of words in the revenue recognition footnote disclosure in the 
most recent 10-K filing before the restatement announcement.  
METHODS Hand 
Collected 
The number of times "recogn" or "record" is used in the revenue recognition 
footnote disclosure in the most recent 10-K filing before the restatement 
announcement. 
RRC SCORE Hand 
Collected 




An indicator set to one if the firm does not have a revenue recognition 
disclosure in the most recent 10-K filing before the restatement 
announcement and zero otherwise. 
LOSSPER Compustat The percentage of years that earnings before extraordinary items (data18) 
was negative since the company began coverage on Compustat through the 
restatement announcement.   
CHSALES Compustat The average change in net sales of the firm (data12) for the two years prior 
to the restatement ((Sales – lag2(Sales))/lag2(Sales)). 
BIGN Compustat An indicator variable equal to one if the firm was audited by a large 
accounting firm (data149) and zero otherwise. 
SALESFCST I/B/E/S An indicator set to one if the firm has an analyst forecast of sales any time 
prior to the restatement announcement and zero otherwise. 
BTM Compustat The firm’s book-to-market ratio (data60 / [data25 * data199]) at the end of 
fiscal year just prior to the restatement announcement. 
AR ACCRUAL Compustat The 5-year average A/R accrual scaled by sales (-data302 /data12) prior to 
the restatement announcement. 
EARNVOL Compustat The standard deviation of earnings (NIBEI, data18) scaled by the absolute 
mean value of earnings using the 5 fiscal years prior to the restatement 
announcement. 
PRERETURN CRSP The 12-month stock returns for the firm prior to the restatement 
announcement, including delisting returns. 
LOGMVE Compustat The logged MVE (data25*data199) at the end of fiscal year just prior to the 
restatement announcement. 
DEBT ISSUE Compustat The sum of long-term and short-term debt issued (data111+data114) divided 
by average total assets (data6) for the fiscal year prior to the restatement 
announcement. 
EQUITY ISSUE Compustat Common and preferred stock issued (data108) divided by average total 
assets (data6) for the fiscal year prior to the restatement announcement. 
LEVERAGE Compustat The ratio of short-term and long-term debt (data9+data104) divided by total 
assets (data6) at the end of the fiscal year just prior to the restatement 
announcement. 
EP Compustat The ratio of earnings per share before extraordinary items (data58) to stock 
price (data199) at the end of the fiscal year just prior to the restatement 
announcement. 
OP ACC Compustat Operating accruals defined as operating income after depreciation less cash 
flows from operations (data178-data308) divided by average total assets 
(data6) for the fiscal year prior to the restatement announcement. 
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Variable Name Source Variable Definition 
LOG PPS Execucomp The change in the value of stock options held for a percentage change in the 
value of the firm (calculated as the option delta*1% of stock price*number 
of options held).  Core and Guay (2002) and Burns and Kedia (2006) 
provide details on the calculation. 
OVERSTATEMENT Hand 
collected 
An indicator equal to one if the sum of the restated revenue over the 
restating periods is less than the sum of the originally reported revenue over 
the restating period, and zero otherwise 
MULTIPLE GAO 
Database 
An indicator equal to one if the firm's restatement included additional areas 
of restatement besides revenue, and zero otherwise.   
MISS GROWTH Compustat 
and Hand 
Collected 
An indicator equal to one if first restating period had positive sales growth 
prior to the restatement and zero or negative sales growth after the 
restatement, and zero otherwise. 
MISS FCST I/B/E/S and 
Hand 
Collected 
An indicator equal to one if for the first restating period (1) the firm had an 
analyst revenue forecast, (2) the firm had previously beat the analyst revenue 
forecast for that period, and (3) the restatement caused the firm to miss for 
that period, and zero otherwise.   
AAER Dechow et 
al. (2007) 
AAER is an indicator set to one if the firm has an SEC AAER related to 
revenue or receivables within 2 years of the restatement announcement. 
CAR CRSP The 5-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the restatement 
announcement date.  Abnormal returns are market adjusted returns and 
calculated as the raw return for the firm less the market return for each day. 
CEO LEFT Execucomp 
& Hand 
Collected 
An indicator set to one if the CEO resigns or is terminated within two years 
of the restatement announcement, but excludes CEO resignation where the 
former CEO retains a Chair or a Director position.   
RESTLEN Hand 
Collected 
The number of quarters the firm restated. 
CHREV Hand 
Collected 




The percentage change in income over all periods of the restatement due to 
the restatement. 
ROA Compustat The return on assets (NIBEI/Assets – data18/data6) for the fiscal year just 
prior to the restatement announcement 
POSTRETURN CRSP The 12-month stock returns for the firm following the restatement 
announcement, including delisting returns. 
SUBJECTIVE Hand 
Collected 
A count variable equal to the number of subjective revenue recognition 
methods identified in the revenue recognition disclosure.  I search for the 
following key words: “percentage of completion” or “percentage-of-
completion”, “multiple deliverables”, “vendor-specific objective evidence” 
or “VSOE”, “barter” or “non-monetary”, and “fair value” or “fair-value.” 








Panel A: Revenue restatement sample selection
Total GAO restatement firms (1997 - 2005) 738
   Missing Compustat/CRSP data (150)
   Multiple restatements/year (33)
   Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) (53)
   No filings available (11)
   Not revenue restaters (39)
   SAB101 and EITF firms (104)
Revenue restatement sample firms 348
Panel B: Comparison sample selection (restatement and matched-sample)
Total GAO restatement firms 1567
   Missing Compustat/CRSP data (249)
   Multiple restatements/year (48)
   Financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) (221)
   No filings available (86)
   In revenue sample (123)
Other restatement firms 840
Total matched sample firms 338      
Missing Compustat/CRSP data (22)
Matched sample firms 316
Revenue restatement sample firms w/PPS data 102
Matched sample firms w/PPS data 102      
TABLE 1
Sample selection
This table presents the attrition of the revenue restatement sample (Panel A) and the comparison samples (Panel B).  
Restatements are obtained from the 2002 and 2006 GAO restatement reports and cover the years 1997-2005.  Firms with 
missing Compustat/CRSP data necessary to run tests are removed from the sample.  I keep only the first restatement for 
firms that have more than one restatement within a calendar year.  Financial firms are removed from the sample (one-digit 
SIC=6) as these firms have revenue recognition that is substantially different from other firms.  Firms with missing 10-K 
filings on the SEC Edgar website prior to the restatement announcement are removed from the sample.  In Panel B, firms 
that have been identified as a revenue restatement firm are removed from the non-revenue restatement sample.  The matched 
sample is selected by identifying a set of potential matches of the sample firm that are in the same fiscal year as the sample 
firm's fiscal year just prior to the restatement announcement, have data on EXECUCOMP, and have total assets (data6) 
within 70 and 130 percent of the sample firm's total assets.  The matched firm is selected as the one with the book-to-market 







Panel A: Restatements by year and restatement type
Restatement Type 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Revenue 15 23 30 53 28 45 51 53 50 348
Non-Revenue 33 38 67 50 55 110 87 138 262 840
Total Restatements 48 61 97 103 83 155 138 191 312 1188
Panel B: Restatements (Revenue/Non-Revenue) by year and industry
Industrya 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Total
Mining & construction 0/1 0/3 0/1 0/3 2/5 2/13 1/10 3/13 0/11 8/60
Communications 1/3 0/2 0/0 4/1 1/1 0/6 4/5 2/13 0/16 12/47
Manufacturing 5/17 9/16 10/28 16/20 11/24 9/42 18/36 15/48 22/75 115/306
Other 0/0 0/0 1/1 0/2 0/0 0/2 0/0 0/0 0/1 1/6
Services 2/3 1/5 0/8 7/6 2/6 7/6 8/6 10/18 12/23 49/81
Technology 6/5 12/6 8/19 22/10 9/7 21/6 11/8 18/13 8/25 115/99
Transportation 0/0 0/1 1/0 1/2 0/1 0/7 2/1 2/7 0/5 6/24
Utilities 1/1 0/0 2/4 0/2 0/3 2/11 2/9 1/10 1/10 9/50
Wholesale & retail 0/3 1/5 8/6 3/4 3/8 4/17 5/12 2/16 7/96 33/167
Total 15/33 23/38 30/67 53/50 28/55 45/110 51/87 53/138 50/262 348/840





b  72 observations have both company and another source for the restatement and are excluded as being identified 
by the company.  
99 210
Total
211 47 20 70 348
Companyb Other/Unknown
a  Industry classification is from Palmrose et al. (2004) and defined by the following SIC codes: Mining & 
construction=0-1999, manufacturing=2000-3999 (except codes assigned to technology), technology=3570-3579 
plus 7370-7379, transportation=4000-4799, communications=4800-4899, utilities=4900-4999, 





This table presents the frequency of restatements for each year in the sample. Panel A reports frequency by
revenue restatements and non-revenue restatements. Panel B reports those same frequencies by industry; the
first/second number is the number of revenue/non-revenue restatements during the year. Panel C presents the
frequency of restatement type by source of the restatement according to the press release for the restatement.
The sample of restatements is obtained from the 2002 and 2006 GAO restatement reports and contains
restatements during the years 1997-2005. Financial firms are removed from the sample (one-digit SIC=6) as
these firms have revenue recognition that is substantially different from other firms.
Year
Year








Panel A: Revenue recognition disclosure statistics
Revenue Restatments and Non-Revenue Restatement
N Mean Std. N Mean Std. N Mean Std. Diff. t-test
WORDS 1188 210.49 234.76 348 267.83 248.80 840 186.73 224.59 81.10 5.26
METHODS 1188 4.54 4.12 348 5.85 4.42 840 4.00 3.86 1.85 6.82
RRC SCORE 1188 0.00 1.31 348 0.45 1.22 840 -0.18 1.30 0.63 7.92
Revenue Restatements and Matched Sample
N Mean Std. N Mean Std. N Mean Std. Diff. t-test
WORDS 632 216.47 210.61 316 263.10 239.12 316 169.84 165.27 93.26 5.70
METHODS 632 4.92 4.07 316 5.80 4.40 316 4.04 3.51 1.76 5.55
RRC SCORE 632 0.00 1.31 316 0.30 1.31 316 -0.30 1.23 0.61 5.99
Panel B: Revenue recognition disclosure statistic means by industry and sample
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Mining & construction 154.6 108.5 141.1 93.5 117.0 91.0 3.6 3.0 3.1 2.0 2.5 2.5
Communications 214.8 172.5 259.0 153.0 265.0 138.0 6.3 5.0 5.2 4.0 7.3 6.0
Manufacturing 173.6 136.0 142.3 86.5 138.9 99.0 4.1 3.0 3.4 2.0 3.5 3.0
Other 268.0 268.0 213.7 49.0 249.6 143.5 5.0 5.0 4.8 1.5 4.8 3.0
Services 332.4 259.0 224.6 153.0 234.9 172.0 6.9 6.0 4.1 3.0 4.2 3.0
Technology 391.9 291.0 419.9 342.0 245.6 196.0 8.3 7.0 7.9 7.0 5.9 5.0
Transportation 157.7 127.0 239.2 157.0 51.0 33.5 4.2 4.0 5.5 4.0 1.8 2.0
Utilities 109.2 95.0 204.8 132.5 551.5 551.5 3.0 3.0 3.6 3.0 8.0 8.0
Wholesale & retail 178.0 115.0 93.8 67.0 113.8 60.0 3.6 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.9 2.0
All Industries 267.8 188.0 186.7 104.0 169.8 113.0 5.9 5.0 4.0 3.0 4.0 3.0
Revenue
TABLE 3
Revenue recognition disclosure statistics
This table contains revenue recognition disclosure statistics.  The sample of interest is a sample of 348 revenue 
restatements.  I use two comparison samples, a sample of non-revenue restatements occuring over the same sample period 
and a matched sample.  More detail about the samples can be found in Table 1.   Panel A  presents descriptive statistics 
for the revenue recognition disclosure statistics (WORDS , METHODS , and RRC SCORE ) by sample.  Panel B presents 
both WORDS  and METHODS  sample means for each industry.  Industry definitions can be found in Table 2 and detailed 
variable definitions can be found in Appendix 2.  WORDS  and METHODS  are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles.  T-
tests (2-tailed) are calculated on the difference in means.
METHODS
Revenue Restate Non-Revenue Restate










Panel A: Restatement research design descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. 25th Med. 75th N Mean Std. 25th Med. 75th Diff. t-test
RRC SCORE 348 0.445 1.225 -0.373 0.316 1.138 840 -0.184 1.297 -0.847 -0.286 0.453 0.629 7.92
BTM 348 0.496 0.534 0.165 0.395 0.712 840 0.613 0.606 0.258 0.500 0.814 -0.117 -3.30
LOSSPER 348 0.408 0.337 0.125 0.333 0.667 840 0.321 0.319 0.043 0.222 0.500 0.087 4.11
SALEFCST 348 0.753 0.432 1 1 1 840 0.665 0.472 0 1 1 0.087 3.09
EARNVOL 348 5.751 13.643 0.963 1.715 3.914 840 5.106 12.234 0.904 1.482 3.737 0.645 0.76
CHSALES 348 0.212 0.481 0.012 0.123 0.318 840 0.175 0.496 -0.020 0.085 0.233 0.037 1.18
PRERETURN 348 -0.191 0.954 -0.704 -0.352 0.032 840 0.004 0.964 -0.436 -0.134 0.214 -0.194 -3.19
BIGN 348 0.876 0.330 1 1 1 840 0.880 0.325 1 1 1 -0.003 -0.16
LOGMVE 348 5.659 1.822 4.368 5.458 6.734 840 5.668 2.069 4.191 5.621 7.047 -0.009 -0.08
AR ACCRUAL 348 0.054 0.069 0.011 0.035 0.072 840 0.024 0.051 0.001 0.009 0.032 0.029 7.09
Panel B: Matched-sample research design descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. 25th Med. 75th N Mean Std. 25th Med. 75th Diff. t-test
RRC SCORE 316 0.303 1.310 -0.589 0.181 1.032 316 -0.303 1.232 -0.930 -0.394 0.308 0.606 5.99
BTM 316 0.499 0.484 0.188 0.401 0.744 316 0.492 0.460 0.189 0.396 0.704 0.007 0.18
LOSSPER 316 0.400 0.339 0.119 0.304 0.667 316 0.336 0.354 0.033 0.176 0.575 0.064 2.32
SALEFCST 316 0.712 0.454 0 1 1 316 0.753 0.432 1 1 1 -0.041 -1.17
EARNVOL 316 5.979 15.237 0.950 1.597 3.906 316 3.799 11.922 0.822 1.323 2.122 2.180 2.00
CHSALES 316 0.209 0.427 0.018 0.124 0.303 316 0.088 0.440 -0.023 0.079 0.177 0.121 3.52
PRERETURN 316 -0.194 0.811 -0.683 -0.352 0.032 316 0.032 0.914 -0.498 -0.167 0.182 -0.226 -3.29
BIGN 316 0.896 0.306 1 1 1 316 0.953 0.213 1 1 1 -0.057 -2.71
LOGMVE 316 5.739 1.775 4.449 5.538 6.844 316 5.920 1.748 4.715 5.830 6.917 -0.181 -1.29
AR ACCRUAL 316 0.052 0.073 0.010 0.034 0.071 316 0.039 0.092 0.002 0.014 0.044 0.014 2.09
DEBT ISSUE 316 0.120 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.120 316 0.083 0.197 0.000 0.000 0.066 0.037 2.08
EQUITY ISSUE 316 0.149 0.350 0.002 0.012 0.056 316 0.093 0.254 0.002 0.009 0.033 0.056 2.32
LEVERAGE 316 0.157 0.214 0.001 0.053 0.249 316 0.160 0.216 0.000 0.076 0.245 -0.003 -0.18
EP 316 -0.126 0.361 -0.111 -0.006 0.040 316 -0.104 0.349 -0.102 0.018 0.052 -0.022 -0.79
OP ACC 316 -0.022 0.137 -0.082 -0.020 0.042 316 -0.040 0.120 -0.090 -0.023 0.023 0.018 1.74
LOG PPS 102 4.860 1.352 4.060 4.734 5.663 102 4.711 1.364 3.659 4.547 5.697 0.149 0.78
This table contains descriptive statistics for revenue and non-revenue restatements (Panel A) and revenue restatements and a matched 
sample (Panel B).  The sample of restatements is obtained from the 2002 and 2006 GAO restatement reports and contains restatements 
during the years 1997-2005. All variable definitions can be found in Appendix 2.  All variables except LOSSPER, PRERETURN , 
LOGMVE, LOG PPS  and indicator variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles for each combined sample.  T-tests (2-tailed) are 
calculated on the difference in means for the revenue and non-revenue restatement observations.
TABLE 4
Revenue Restatements Non-Revenue Restatements
Descriptive statistics




Panel A: Selected Correlations for Revenue Restatement and Non-Revenue Restatement Firms













































REVENUE 1 0.236 -0.104 0.124 0.086 -0.124 0.129 0.228 0.044 0.078 -0.183
RRC SCORE 0.219 1 -0.152 0.189 0.189 -0.080 0.142 0.319 0.104 0.020 -0.052
BTM -0.091 -0.135 1 -0.154 -0.089 0.121 -0.087 -0.198 0.090 -0.218 -0.048
LOSSPER 0.121 0.152 -0.121 1 -0.201 -0.637 -0.087 0.383 0.282 0.055 -0.192
SALEFCST 0.086 0.193 -0.132 -0.184 1 0.207 0.081 0.002 -0.041 0.098 0.004
EARNVOL 0.010 -0.001 0.057 -0.351 0.103 1 0.340 -0.342 -0.013 -0.093 0.151
CHSALES 0.031 0.042 0.045 -0.262 0.085 0.859 1 0.205 0.040 0.004 0.011
PRERETURN -0.002 0.032 -0.080 0.336 -0.054 -0.760 -0.739 1 0.044 0.055 -0.166
BIGN 0.023 -0.005 0.158 0.013 -0.055 0.040 0.024 -0.055 1 -0.169 -0.026
LOGMVE 0.034 0.009 -0.128 0.224 0.016 -0.241 -0.149 0.161 -0.064 1 -0.096
AR ACCRUAL -0.092 -0.005 -0.065 -0.049 0.005 0.038 0.023 -0.036 0.014 -0.030 1
Panel B: Selected Correlations for Revenue Restatement and Matched Sample Firms





















































REVENUE 1 0.233 0.122 -0.046 0.140 0.153 -0.172 -0.108 0.205 0.090 0.058 0.006
RRC SCORE 0.232 1 0.289 0.139 0.179 -0.038 -0.055 0.014 0.142 -0.117 0.134 -0.036
LOSSPER 0.092 0.228 1 0.035 0.101 -0.222 -0.146 0.078 -0.137 0.043 -0.473 -0.015
SALEFCST -0.047 0.144 -0.010 1 0.217 0.115 -0.167 -0.139 0.251 -0.168 0.356 -0.186
EARNVOL 0.080 0.001 0.107 -0.027 1 0.009 -0.073 0.083 0.018 0.002 0.005 0.037
CHSALES 0.139 -0.024 -0.131 0.203 -0.012 1 -0.067 -0.026 -0.063 -0.024 -0.092 -0.028
PRERETURN -0.130 -0.010 -0.151 0.000 -0.049 0.038 1 -0.078 0.338 0.098 0.350 -0.001
BIGN -0.108 0.034 0.039 -0.139 0.083 -0.025 0.040 1 -0.170 0.015 -0.043 0.105
AR ACCRUAL 0.083 0.034 -0.121 0.312 0.017 -0.013 0.465 -0.115 1 0.022 -0.056 0.044
DEBT ISSUE 0.083 -0.031 -0.054 0.004 -0.046 0.070 0.162 0.036 0.034 1 0.084 0.227
EQUITY ISSUE 0.092 0.008 -0.227 0.419 -0.033 -0.079 0.263 0.004 -0.078 -0.057 1 -0.182
LEVERAGE -0.007 0.038 -0.189 -0.011 0.025 0.078 0.092 0.032 0.031 0.161 -0.098 1
This table contains Pearson and Spearman rank correlations for select variables using two sets of firms: 1) Revenue restatement and 
non-revenue restatement firms (Panel A) and 2) Revenue restatement firms and matched-sample firms (Panel B).  REVENUE  is an 
indicator equal to one if the firm restated revenue and zero if the firm restated something other than revenue.  All of the other 




Prediction Coefficient Effects Z-statistic
RRC SCORE + 0.347 0.086 *** 4.71
Value Relevance
BTM - -0.264 -0.029 *  -1.77
LOSSPER + 0.277 0.017   1.01
SALESFCST  (d) + 0.479 0.086 ** 2.48
EARNVOL + 0.007 0.016   1.31
Governance
CHSALES - -0.307 -0.029 *  -1.78
PRERETURN - -0.263 -0.048 ** -2.29
BIGN (d) ? -0.424 -0.086 *  -1.74
LOGMVE ? 0.039 0.015   0.78
AUDITOR (d) ? 0.252 0.050   1.20
Other
AR ACCRUAL + 4.739 0.052 *** 3.05
Intercept -1.88
Industry & Year (not presented)
N 1188    
Chi2 161.8 ***
Psuedo R2 0.157    
Correctly Classified 75.8%
This table presents estimates of a logistic regression model where the dependent variable is one if the firm restated 
revenue and zero if the firm restated something other than revenue.  All variables are as explained in Appendix 2.  Z-
statistics are presented using Huber/White robust standard errors with firm-level clustering to adjust standard errors 
for multiple restatements from the same firm.  Marginal effects are calculated for each continuous variable as the 
change in the predicted probability as the variable moves one standard deviation centered at the mean, holding all 
other variables constant at their mean values.  Marginal effects for indicator variables are similarly calculated, but 
with the change in the predicted probability calculated as the indicator variable moves from zero to one.  Results for 
industry and year indicators are not shown but are included in the model. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance 
of the coefficient at the 10, 5, or 1 percent level.
TABLE 6




Predict. Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z
RRC SCORE + 0.362 0.116 *** 4.33 0.388 0.125 *** 4.51 0.670 0.217 *** 3.63
BTM - 0.194 0.022    0.91 0.299 0.034    1.35 0.128 0.018    0.33
LOSSPER + -0.247 -0.020    -0.75 -0.176 -0.014    -0.47 -0.589 -0.029    -0.53
SALESFCST (d) + -0.355 -0.037    -1.64 -0.359 -0.037    -1.62 0.370 0.035    0.78
EARNVOL + 0.012 0.031    1.64 0.011 0.030    1.53 -0.003 -0.053    -0.70
CHSALES - 0.924 0.096 *** 3.49 0.621 0.064 ** 2.26 0.193 0.014    0.29
PRERETURN - -0.206 -0.049 *  -1.79 -0.220 -0.052 *  -1.87 -0.247 -0.040    -0.98
BIGN (d) ? -1.151 -0.051 *** -3.73 -1.171 -0.052 *** -3.78 0.536 0.016    0.44
LOGMVE -0.037 -0.017    -0.56 -0.027 -0.012    -0.40 -0.075 -0.030    -0.43
AR ACCRUAL + -0.092 -0.003    -0.07 -0.278 -0.010    -0.21 -0.196 -0.008    -0.14
DEBT ISSUE +                        0.950 0.064 ** 2.05 2.258 0.157 *  1.71
EQUITY ISSUE +                        0.590 0.034 *  1.67 4.025 0.068    1.41
LEVERAGE +                        -0.214 -0.014    -0.44 0.144 0.007    0.14
EP -                        0.049 0.005    0.16 -0.500 -0.041    -0.95
OP ACC +                        1.745 0.051 ** 2.16 2.827 0.058    1.13
LOG PPS +              0.136 0.046    0.71
Intercept 1.510              1.401              -1.552              
Industry (not presented)
N 632 632    204    
Chi2 115.2 *** 128.1 *** 53.2 ***
Psuedo R2 0.132 0.146    0.188    
Including PPS
TABLE 7
Logistic regression estimates to test H1 using a matched sample design
This table presents estimates of a logistic regression model using a matched sample where the dependent variable is one if the firm 
restated revenue and zero if the firm did not restate revenue.  The first specification includes only relevant variables from the model in 
Table 6.  The second and third specifications add additional control variables.  All variables are as explained in Appendix 2.  Z-statistics 
are presented using Huber/White robust standard errors with firm-level clustering to adjust standard errors for multiple restatements 
from the same firm.  Marginal effects are calculated for each continuous variable as the change in the predicted probability as the 
variable moves one standard deviation centered at the mean, holding all other variables constant at their mean values.  Marginal effects 
for indicator variables are similarly calculated, but with the change in the predicted probability calculated as the indicator variable 
moves from zero to one.  Results for industry and year indicators are not shown but are included in the model. *, **, *** indicate 
statistical significance of the coefficient at the 10, 5, or 1 percent level.
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RRC SCORE - -0.39 *** + 0.023 ** - -0.212   
-2.97   2.54   -1.61   
BIGN + 0.908                          
1.48                          
MISSFCST + 0.058                          
0.12                          
RESTLEN + 0.011                          
0.5                          
AUDITOR + 0.137   - 0.028               
0.34   0.85               
MULTIPLE ? 0.75 ** ? -0.014   ? 0.376   
2.19   -0.65   1.30   
LOGMVE + 0.207 ** ? -0.003   ? -0.143 *  
2.34   -0.44   -1.75   
CHREV - -3.48 *** + 0.399 *** - -0.303   
-3.08   3.19   -0.29   
CHNI - 0.157 ** + 0.005   - 0.061   
1.97   0.85   0.76   
AAER             - -0.121 *** + 0.607 *  
            -3.96   1.80   
BTM             + 0.003               
            0.14               
PRERETURN             - -0.033 *** - -0.387   
            -3.63   -1.15   
POSTRETURN                        - -0.576 ** 
                       -2.00   
ROA                        - -0.872 ** 
                       -2.13   
CAR                        - -0.379   
                       -0.57   
Intercept -4.672 *** -0.010   -1.791   
-3.78   -0.14   -1.45   
Industry (not presented)
N 347   348 347   
Chi2 / F 30.02 ***          .    37.621 ***
Pseudo R2 / R2 0.104    0.216    0.126    
TABLE 10
This table contains logistic and OLS regression estimates using a sample of 348 revenue restatement firms to determine if
revenue recognition complexity affects the consequences of restatement to the firm/managers. The first model (AAER)
estimates a logistic regression with the dependent variable set to one if the revenue restatement was accompanied by an SEC
AAER and zero otherwise. The second model (CAR) is an OLS regression of 5-day cumulative abnormal annoucement
returns on restatement and firm characteristics. Finally, the third (CEO Turnover) estimates a logistic regression with a
dependent variable set to one if the CEO departs anytime in the two years following the restatement announcement and zero
otherwise. All control variables are as explained in Appendix 2. Z-statistics (for Logistic) and t-statistics (for OLS) are
listed below each coefficient. I use Huber/White Robust standard errors with firm-level clustering to control for multiple
restatements by the same firm. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance of the coefficient at the 10, 5, or 1 percent level.
AAER CEO Turnover





Variable N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev. Diff. t-test
WORDS 339 268.3 251.4 807 183.9 221.1 84.3 5.37
POST WORDS 339 370.3 319.1 807 222.6 250.1 147.7 7.60
Difference 102.1 *** 38.7 *** 63.4 5.17
t-test 6.51 6.43
METHODS 339 5.81 4.44 807 3.95 3.80 1.86 6.74
POST METHODS 339 7.54 5.67 807 4.50 4.30 3.04 8.86
Difference 1.7 *** 0.5 *** 1.2 5.48
t-test 7.24 5.21
RRC SCORE 339 0.434 1.23 807 -0.199 1.29 0.633 7.82
POST RRC SCORE 339 0.554 1.32 807 -0.233 1.23 0.787 9.42
Difference 0.120 ** -0.034 0.154 2.45
t-test 2.15 -1.02
This table contains comparisons of revenue recognition disclosure statistics pre- and post-restatement for both 
revenue and non-revenue restatement firms.  The number of firms differs from those presented in Table 1 due to 
the requirement to have post-restatement revenue recognition disclosures.  Variable definitions can be found in 
Appendix 2.  All t-tests are 2-tailed.
Revenue Restatements Non-Revenue Restatements
TABLE 11
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